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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

\•/ALTER J. THOMAS I
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No.
17340

-vsLAWRENCE MORRIS, Warden,
Utah State Prison,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with and pleaded guilty
to one count of forcible sexual abuse upon a child, pursuant
to Utat Code Annotated § 76-5-404 (1) (b).

After an initial

commitment to the Utah State Hospital and a later imposition
of a suspended sentence and placement on probation, the
appellant's probation was revoked and he was incarcerated
in the Utah State Prison.

The appellant sought relief in the form of a
Petition for habeas corpus which was denied when respondent's
motion to dismiss was granted.

Thereafter, respondent

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stipulated to an order vacating the judgment of d · ·
ism1ssa'.
Appellant's second application for habeas corpus relief
'1

was similarly dismissed;

from that order the present appe; II

is taken.

I
II
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant filed a petition for a writ of

habeas corpus in the Third Judicial District Court, in ar.:
for Salt Lake county.
petition.

The respondent moved to dismiss ti·

I

The Honorable James S. Sawaya, took the motio:.

under advisement and eventually dismissed the petition.
The respondent later stipulated to a motion to vacate tbe
order of dismissal.

After considering appellant's reply

memorandum and respondent's supplemental memorandum in
support of a motion to dismiss, the court again granted
the motion to dismiss on the grounds stated in responden:'•
memoranda.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent seeks an order and judgment
affirming the order of the lower court dismissing the
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus·

-2-
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The appellant was charged with the crime of
forcible sexual abuse, a violation of Utah Code Ann.
§

76-5-404 (1) (b), a felony of the third deqree (R. at S).

on October 1, 1973, the appellant entered a plea of guilty
to the charge and the court ordered a mental evaluation
of the appellant for purposes of a sanity hearing (R. at 14) .
Based on expert testimony produced at the hearing (the
date of the hearing does not appear in the record) , the
court found that the appellant suffered from an abnormal
mental condition, and on Hovember 8, 1973, ordered him
to be committed to the Utah State Hospital for life "or
until such time as further action as provided" by U.C.A.
§

77-49-1 et seq. occurred (R. at 6,14).

The court further

ordered that the appellant be returned to the court on
November 8, 1974 to hear additional psychiatric evaluations
of the appellant's status (R. at 6).

The appellant took

no direct appeal from the court's order of commitment
which issued November 8, 1973.

Approximately two and one

half months after the order of commitment was entered, a
letter was written to the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins
from doctors Johnson and Austin recommending that the
appellant "could be more appropriately managed" in prison
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rather than in a hospital setting.
Apparently, the hearing which was scheduled fc:
November 8, 1974,was held four months later on April 10,
1975.

During the April, 197 5 hearing, the appellant's

status was reviewed and the recommendations from severai
doctors at the Utah State Hospital were considered (R. at
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found no bas_:
for placing the appellant on probation and the appellant
was returned to the hospital (R. at 14, 15) .
no review of this decision was sought.

As before,

In approximate!;

May of 1977 (no definite date is found in the record),
the court once again reviewed appellant's commitment to
the hospital (R. at 15).

On July 29, 1977, the court one'

again reviewed appellant's status and sentenced him

to~-

indeterminate term of zero to five years in the Utah
State Prison (R. at 15).

The court, however, suspended

the sentence and placed the appellant on probation on

'I

condition that he take part in the Sexual Offenders Pnxr'
at the Utah State Hospital and co!1tinue to reside at the
hospital during his participation in the program (R. at Again, appellant sought no appellate review of

the sente::1

order.

In December of 1977, the Department of Adult

Probation and Parole requested that the appellant's

I

probation be revoked on the ground that the conditions
!

I

-4-
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his probation had been violated (R. at 15).

The revocation

request stated that the appellant had failed to abide by
the rules and regulations of the Sexual Offender Program
~

refusing to eat or drink for three days or to take the

required medication, and by requesting to be released from
t~

hospital (R. at 15).

On January 25, 1978, the court

ordered the appellant's probation revoked and the original
sentence imposed on July 29, 1977 to commence.

The

appellant, again, sought no review of the revocation order.
On October 29, 1979, the appellant filed a
pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus (R. at 2).
However, on the court's own motion, counsel was appointed
to aid the appellant (R. at 11) .

The petition alleged

that sentence was unlawfully imposed and that appellant's
due process rights had been violated (R. at 3) .

The

petition further alleged that appellant was entitled to
credit for "time served in the Utah State Prison [Hospital)."
On November 6, 1979, respondent filed a motion to dismiss
the Petition, accompanied by a supportinq memorandum
(R.

at 12,14).

On February 22, 1980, after a hearing

at which arguments were considered, the court granted
respondent's motion to dismiss (R. at 22).

Once more,

the appellant failed to take a timely appeal for review
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of the order of dismissal.

Later, on March 17, i 9801

a stipulation to vacate the order of dismissal was
filed to allow the appellant to submit a memorandum
in response to the respondent's motion to dismiss (R.
at 23) .

After the filing of respondent's supplemental

memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, an
order granting the motion was entered (R. at 37).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT HAS WAIVED THE CONSIDERATION
OF ISSUES CONCERNING SENTENCING BY FAILING
TO RECORD TIMELY OBJECTIONS IN THE COURTS
BELOW AND BY FAILING TO RAISE SUCH ISSUES
ON DIRECT APPEAL.

The chronology of events and statement of facts
reveal that the appellant took no direct appeal from~
order of commitment or from the order imposing a suspende'
sentence and probation.

Similarly, there is no record

o'.

contemporaneous objections interposed to the lower court''
actions or attempts made by the appellant to assert his
desire for sentencing and transfer to the Utah State pn::·
previous to the instant petition for habeas corpus .
Failure of the appellant to properly preserve these

. SU''
15
·

. ne of waiver to each o'. [
requires application of the doctrl
i
f

-6-
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appellant's allegations raised in the instant appeal.
In Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968, 969 (Utah 1968), this
~urt

addressed the consideration of issues raised for

the first time in an appeal from a denial of postconviction relief:
If the contention of error is something
which is known or should be known to the
party at the time judgment was entered,
it must be reviewed in the manner and
within the ti~e permitted by regular
prescribed [appellate] procedure, or the
judgment becomes final and is not subject
to further attack
This doctrine of waiver has been sustained in more recent
opinions of this Court.
816

See Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d

(Utah 1980); Pierre v. Morris, 607 P.2d 812 (Utah 1980).

In the present case, the appellant was or should have been
aware of any issue of sentencing delay at the time he was
sentenced to a suspended term of confinement in the Utah
State Prison and placed on probation on July 29, 1977.
However, it was not until October 29, 1979, over two years
after the appellant's probation was revoked, that the
issue of sentencing delay was first raised in the present
petition for habeas corpus.
Appellant's present assertion of his alleged
Sixth Amendment right to speedy sentencing is further
weakened by the fact that the record on appeal contains

-7-
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no mention of a contemporaneous objection interposed by
the appellant to the court's order of commitment or
sentencing procedure.

Such contemporaneous objectiom

are required to properly preserve issues on appeal.
See Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and Rule 46 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Alternatively, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 sti::
that, "Within three months: For relief pursuant to a wm
of habeas corpus.

This limitation shall apply not only as

to grounds known to petitioner but also to grounds which
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner."

bee~

A penoc

of over two years expired between the order imposing a
suspended prison sentence and probation on appellant on
July 29, 1977, and the filing of the instant petition for
habeas corpus relief on October 29, 1979.

Certainly, any

potential claim of sentencing delay allegedly in violauo:
of the Sixth Amendment was apparent or should have been
apparent in July of 1977 or at the latest in January of
1978 when appellant's probation was revoked.

It is also

certain that any due process claim, equal protection

c)ai:

or claim for credit for commitment time at the state

hospital was apparent at the time of sentencing.
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onlY tr.:

claim of judge disqualification escapes the application
of the three

~onth

statute of limitations.

However,

even the issue of judge disqualification was waived by
appellant in the lower court (see Point IV infra) .
As a general rule, the appellant should be
barred from litigating these issues in the present appeal
where they were neither preserved at trial by contemporaneous
objection nor timely asserted on direct appeal.

Appellant's

contentions should be deemed waived for purposes of this
appeal.
The sole exception to the waiver doctrine occurs
where an appellant shows both cause for his failure to
comply with the state procedural rule, and actual prejudice
resulting from the alleged constitutional violation.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).

The appellant

in the instant case makes no attempt to show either cause
or prejudice.
At every stage of the proceedings in the lower
courts, the appellant was represented by counsel.
was present when the plea of guilty was entered.

Counsel
Appellant

was also represented by counsel at all hearings before
and after corruni tment to the state hospital.

Presently,

the appellant makes no attempt to explain his lack of
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compliance with procedural rules requiring co t
n ernporaneou'
objections at trial and that issues be raised on direct
appeal where they were known or should have been known
at the time of appeal.

The requirement of "cause" has

not been met.
Correspondingly, appellant has failed to meet
the prejudice requirement of the Wainwright test.

Althou:·

the opinion in Wainwright failed to provide guidelines as
to the degree of prejudice that must be experienced to
enable an appellant to overcome the waiver doctrine,
subsequent decisions have provided appropriate standards,
In United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178 (1979), three
federal prisoners who had been denied parole sought to
collaterally attack their sentences, alleging that a
post-sentencing change in the policies of the

Unit~

States Parole Commission had prolonged their actual
imprisonment beyond the time intended by the sentencing
judge.

In holding that the alleged error did not support

a collateral attack, the Court stated: "It has, of course,
long been settled law that an error that may justify
reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a
collateral attack on a final judgI'lent."

442 U.S. at

184

·

The Court continued its analysis by examining the degree
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I

of prejudice which would support a collateral attack:
"The Court has held that an error of law does not provide
a basis for collateral attack unless the claimed error
constituted a fundamental defect which inherently results
ina complete miscarriage of justice."

442 U.S. at 185.

If the alleged error claimed by appellant had in fact
been an error, it would not rise to the level of a defect
which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of
justice.
The appellant had numerous opportunities to
assert his claims, but he failed to avail himself of the
orderly processes of appellate procedure.

Futhermore,

the appellant's claims could have been tested in the lower
courts at each of his review hearings as well as at the
sentencing hearing, but the appellant failed in his duty
to contemporaneously object to the proceedings.

Moreover,

the manner in which the commitment and sentence was imposed
was proper and in every way consistent with the statutory
requirements.
The appellant has waived the consideration of
issues contained in his present brief and petition for
post-conviction relief by failing to comply with the
Procedural requirements of appellate review of this state.
~reover, he has failed to make the requisite demonstrations
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of "cause" and "prejudice" to allow this Court to consid::
issues previously waived.

POINT II
THE COMMITMENT OF THE APPELLANT TO THE UTAH
STATE HOSPITAL PURSUANT TO U.C.A. § 77-49-1
ET SEQ. AND THE SUBSEQUENT SENTENCING OF THE
APPELLANT TO A SUSPENDED TERM OF CONFINEMENT
IN THE UTAH STATE PRISON, WERE DIRECTED BY
THE LAWS OF UTAH UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF
THE COURT, AND WERE NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT'S GUARANTEE OF A SPEEDY TRIAL.

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-49-1 states:
~vhenever any person is convicted of, or
pleads guilty to, a charge of rape, sodomy,
incest, indecent exposure, an attempt to
cornrni t any of the foregoing er imes, assault
with intent to commit rape, assault with
intent to cornrni t sodomy, or indecent assault
upon, and taking indecent liberties with t~
body of a minor child, and when it appears
the court, either upon its own observation,
or upon the testimony of a duly licensed
physician that the person so convicted or
pleading guilty is suffering from any form
of abnormal or subnormal mental condition,
or mental illness, the court shall order a
mental examination of such person prior to
imposition of sentence.

In the present case, the appellant was charged with one c:.
of forcible sexual abuse (U. C.A. § 76-5-404 (1) (b)), in thr
he took indecent liberties with the body of a child unde:
fourteen years of age (R. at 5).

To this crime, the

appellant entered a plea of guilty.

Accordingly, the cour:

ordered that a mental examination of the appellant be

-12-
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conducted and the results be presented at a hearing.

At

the conclusion of the hearing, and upon the recommendation
of the examining psychiatrists, who found evidence of an

abnormal mental condition, the court committed the appellant
to the Utah State Hospital

11

for life or until such time as

further action as provided by said statute takes place. 11
(R. at 6).

By the imposition of this commitment the court

was specifically referring to U.C.A. § 77-49-5 which states:
If, however, it appears from such examination
that the person convicted suffers from any
form of abnormal or subnormal mental illness,
or other psychosis, which caused the commission
of the sex offense of which he was convicted,
then the judge shall order the commitment of
such person to the Utah state hospital, to be
confined therein for life, unless he shall be
paroled or pardoned as hereinafter provided.
The court additionally ordered that the appellant be returned
to the court one year from the date of the order if the
appellant was still residing at the hospital (R. at 6}.
On April 10, 1975, the court conducted a hearing
in review of the appellant's status (R. at 14}.

The court

considered the recommendations of several doctors at the
hospital but found no basis for placing the appellant on
probation (R. at 14).

In approximately May of 1977, the

court again reviewed the appellant's commitment (R. at 15) ·
~July 29,

1977, the court sentenced the appellant to serve
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an indeterminate sentence of from zero to five years a:
the Utah State Prison but suspended the sent ence and Plac':
the appellant on probation (R. at 15).

The appellant's

probation was conditioned on the requirement that the
appellant participate in the Public Offenders
and reside at the hospital (R. at 15).

Progr~

At every stage,

including the sentencing on July 29, 1977, the court's
actions were taken pursuant to the laws of Utah.

Sectior.

77-49-7 of the Utah Code Annotated states in pertinent
part that:

11

The parole, probation, or pardon authority

may order the probation, parole, or pardon, following
such certification, and may order the release of such
persons upon such terms, conditions, and limitations as
shall appear necessary to safeguard the convicted person
and the public.

11

The appellant did not then, nor does

he now, contest the propriety of the conditions placed
on his probation.

Similarly, the appellant at no time

objected to the amount of time passing between the entry
of his guilty plea and conviction, and the hearing at
which probation was granted.

Moreover, contrary to

appellant's petition, the record contains no evidence
documenting appellant's attempts to return to court for
an earlier sentencing.

It was not until four months afte:

the appellant's probation had been revoked, that the
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i(

~pEllant,
asser~ed
r~ht

in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus,

his claim of a violation of his Sixth Amendment

to a speedy trial.

Even more interesting is the

fuct that after respondent filed the first motion to
dismiss the petition, the appellant allowed the dismissal
without filing any type of reply memorandum (R. at 24).
This entire scenario of events demonstrates that the
appellant has not acted with good faith in attempting to
escape a legally imposed sentence.
Statutes such as those under which the appellant
was committed

have generally withstood constitutional

attacks such as those asserted by appellant.

See

Minnesota v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).

On equal

protection grounds, such statutes are firm against attack
since" [e] qual protection does not require that all persons
be dealt with identically, but it does require that the
distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for
which the classification is made."
N.W.2d 847, 850 (Neb. 1978).

State v. Little, 261

In Minnesota, the Court held

that such classifications are reasonable since a legislature
is free to recognize degrees of harm and may confine its
restrictions to those classes where the needs are deemed
to be the clearest.

-15-
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Noticeably absent from appellant's brief is
any authority expressly stating that the Sixth Amendment':
guarantee of a speedy trial applies to the period of timE
between conviction and sentencing.

Appellant refers only

to cases which assume arguendo that such an application
is appropriate.

u.s.

In Pollard v. United States, 352

J);

(1956), the defendant attacked the sentence he received
in 1954 on the basis of the Sixth Amendment.

In 1952,

the defendant had pled guilty to a charge of embezzlement.
The sentence that was then imposed later proved to ~
erroneous.

It was not until 1954 that a valid sentence

was finally imposed.

The Court, assuming arguendo that

t~.:

sentence was part of the trial for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment, stated that,

"Whether delay in completing a

prosecution such as here occurred amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation of rights depends on the circumstanc"
•

. The delay must not be purposeful or oppressive.
U.S. at 354.

u

~ ~-

,,.

The Court, after finding that the delay was

neither purposeful nor oppressive,

held that the two yea:

"delay" in sentencing did not violate the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights.

. .
1 y, in
.
th e ca se of e---United
Similar

States v. Tortorella, 391 F.2d 587

(2nd Cir. 1968), also

cited by appellant, the court held that a three year dela:

-16-
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~tween

the entry of a guilty plea and sentencing was

iustified where the government requested the delay for
the purposes of trying co-defendants who had not pleaded
guilty.

Appellant also refers to Lott v. United

states, 309 F. 2d 115 (5th Cir. 1962), where the
court, in affirming the propriety of a sentence
~posed

after a ninety-day delay stated, "Appellate

courts must assume, in absence of anything in the
record to the contrary, that delay in pronouncing
sentence was for a lawful purpose in the orderly process
of handling the case."

309 F.2d at 122.

Appellant refers

to United States v. Grabina, 309 F.2d 783 (2nd Cir. 1962).
However, the decision in Grabina was later vacated and
remanded by the United States Supreme Court on the basis
of a recommendation by the Solicitor General.
States v. Grabina, 369 U.S. 426 (1961).

United

Research does

not disclose the final disposition of the case on remand,
nor does it disclose the entire text of the Solicitor
General's memorandum.

However, a portion of the memorandum

is quoted in United States v. DeBlasis, 206 F. Supp. 38,
39, 40 (D.Md.

1962).

This quoted portion refers primarily

to a defendant's right of allocation and only vaguely refers
to time constraints placed on the sentencing procedure.
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At best, Gabrina only tangentially involves the issue
of sentencing delay and is of no precedential value to
this Court.

Welsh v. United States, 348 F.2d 885 (6th

Cir. 1965), cited by appellant wherein a four year "delay
in sentencing was affirmed, also supports the respondent':
position in the present case.
In this case, the conuni tmen t to the Utah State
Hospital, the subsequent sentence of probation, and the
ultimate revocation of appellant's probation, were all
accomplished pursuant to the laws of this state.

Intere::.

to note is the fact that in each of the cases cited by
the appellant, the appellants there relied primarily

upo~

Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
support their cause.

Rule 32 states in essence that

sentence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay.
Appellant attempts to analogize this reliance with his
reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-1 which states in
pertinent part that the time for pronouncing judgment
must be at least two days and not more than ten days afti'.
the verdict.

.
th''..
However, appellant's attempt to misuse

statute to rob the court of jurisdiction to impose a val:'
sentence must fail as attempts in the cases referred to
by the appellant have failed.
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In State v. Fedder, 262 P.2d 753

(Utah 1953),

this court addressed the proper application of Utah code
Ann. § 77-35-1.
~

"This court has held that the time fixed

the statute is not jurisdictional

and since it

is regarded as merely directory the further provision that
the judgment should be rendered within a reasonable time
has been judicially read into the statute."
755.

262 P. 2d at

Any "delay" which is attributable the operation of

a particular statute, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 77-49-1 et
seq., must be viewed as reasonable.

Moreover, delay alone

is not a sufficient reason to grant appellant's requested
relief.

As indicated in Pollard, supra, the appellant

was required to demonstrate that any delay was purposeful
or oppressive; no such demonstration is made in the instant
case.

Furthermore, even if the "delay" was labelled

"purposeful" because corruni tment was ordered by the court,
appellant fails to show that he suffered any prejudice.
The leading case regarding the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial is Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972).

Although the delay in that case occurred between

arrest and trial, in light of the assumption that the
Sixth Amendment applies to sentencing delays, the principles
of ~ may be extended to the instant case even though
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the appellant in this case stands on a much different fr .. '
"'1
than an appellant who experiences delay before trial.
The Court, in Barker, stated that the "deprivation of ti.'
right to a speedy trial does not per se prejudice the
accused' s ability to defend himself. "

4 O7

u. s.

at 521.

Court then proposed a balancing test for resolving speeu:

trial issues which identified four factors to be used in
assessing whether a defendant had been deprived of his
(1)

length of delay;

(2)

the reason for the delay; (JI

defendant's assertion of the right; and (4) prejudiceto
defendant.

407

u. s.

at 530.

In analyzing the first two

factors, it is important to note that the "delay" in the I
II

present case is significantly different than "delay" as
commonly discussed.

Most commonly, delay refers to a pd

of time during which a proceeding should have occurred t;"f
not because of a procedural breach by one of the

parties·~
I

causea the interruption of the normal course of events.
However, in the present case, no procedural breach occur:o",
I

and the normal course of events, pursuant to law, contin::,
uninterrupted.

The appellant had been corrunitted for

.1

·
1 y th ree an d one- h a 1 f year s when, after sever,.
approximate

hearings, it was determined by the court t h a t he should :l

1

·
a suspended sentence and be placed on probation.
conuni tment and sentence were authorized by law.

Both
seen

t'I

1~ ·

light, there was in fact no "delay" as the terr.i is cornrrc.
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used.

Even if the corruni tment time could be termed "delay,"

the reason for the "delay" was justified.

After the

appellant's entry of a guilty plea, the court conducted
a hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

77-49-5 to determine

whether the appellant suffered from an abnormal mental
condition.

Experts testifying at this hearing had found

evidence of an abnormal or subnormal mental condition which
contributed to the corrunission of the crime.

Hearings

conducted after the letter from Drs. Johnson and Austin
(see Statement of Facts) addressed to the Honorable D.
Frank Wilkins dated January 2 9, 19 7 4, recommending that
the appellant be transferred to the Utah State Prison
failed to elicit evidence sufficiently persuasive to support
a transfer or earlier sentencing.

Simply stated, no legal error

was committed by the lower court in not transferring the
appellant on the recommendation contained in the letter of
January 2 9, 19 7 4.

Such a recommendation is simply not

binding on the court.

To hold otherwise would allow a

psychiatrist to impose sentence through his report.
Trueblood v. Tinsley, 366 P.2d 655 (Colo. 1961).

In other

words, without an accompanying hearing, the letter alone
did not rise to the level of a legal reason supporting the
transfer of the appellant.
An analysis of the third factor mentioned in
~' the defendant's assertion of his Sixth Amendment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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right, likewise does not favor the appellant• s posit·

!Or•.

He asserts that several attempts were made to return tc
court for sentencing, yet the record does not support
this assertion.

In view of this deficiency, the appelL

has failed to overcome his affirmative burden to
demonstrate any purposeful delay by the State during or
after the appellant IS assertion Of his Speedy trial rig'.:
Likewise, there is no record of the appellant objecting·.
or contesting his commitment.

There is also no basis !c:

assuming that the appellant at the review

hearingsd~r
i

thing more than attempt to secure his release via probat:i
I

or pardon.

There is no record of the appellant asserfr:I

right to a speedy sentencing at any time previous to hi:
present petition for habeas corpus.
The fourth factor referred to in
prejudice to the defendant.

~

is

The appellant here does not

demonstrate any prejudice, with the possible exceptionc'
having to serve more time in the Utah State Prison than
if there had been no commitment to the hospital.

Howe·ie:,

such a distinction affords no basis for habeas corpus

re:!

on either due process or equal protection grounds.
74
Thibodeau v. Commonwealth, 319 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 19 1· .
1

People v. Superior Court, 145 Cal.Rptr. 711 (Cal.APP· :·\
.
t provisi::
the defendants assailed the extended cornrnitmen
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California's mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) statute.
They contended that they were denied equal protection since
~rsons

convicted of the same crime, but sentenced to prison

rather than committed as MDSOs, were not subject to
extensions of commitment past the maximum sentence.

The

court held that there was no violation in stating that,
"The difference in the mental condition of the two classes
is an adequate constitutional ground for the difference
herein involved."

145 Cal. Rptr. at 715.

This constitutionally

sound difference is grounded in the reasons for commitment
and prison confinement; prison confinement is punishment for
the offense committed, whereas commitment for the sex offender
is for the treatment and rehabilitation of the offender and the
protection of society.

Laws providing for the commitment of

sex offenders are not penal in nature.
360 F.2d 118

(7th Cir. 1966).

Butler v. Burke,

such underlying purposes of

treatment and rehabilitation have formed the basis for
nlli"erous laws which allow offenders corning within their
purview to serve longer terms of supervision than the
maximum confinement of those otherwise sentenced.

See

United States v. Vaught, 355 F.Supp. 1348 (W.D. Mo. 1972), and
Guidry v. United States, 433 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1970),
concerning youth offenders.
Furthermore, because the provisions of Utah Code
Ann.

§

77-49-1 et seq. were properly and constitutionally
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applied to appellant, he lacks standing to challenge u,,
here.

This Court in State v.

Phillips, 540 p 2
• d 936 (C:,i

1975), stated:
Also important to be considered as
pertaining to the problem in this case 1
is the principle that no one should be
entitled to challenge a statute and have
i t declared void because i t may unjustly
affect someone else, but could properly
do so only if his own rights are adversely
affected.
i

Because appellant was afforded all rights under the law)

!

Constitution of Utah as well as under the United States
Constitution, he has no standing to assert his present
claims.
POINT III
SINCE THE APPELLANT' S COMMITMEHT TO THE
UTAH STATE HOSPITAL WAS FOR TREATMENT AND
REHABILITATION, AND NOT PENAL IN NATURE,
CREDIT FOR THE PERIOD OF COMMITMENT IS
PROPERLY DENIED, AND IS, MOREOVER, AN
ISSUE APPROPRIATELY DISPOSED OF BY THE
BOARD OF PARDONS.
The appellant requests credit against his sente~
for time spent at the Utah State Hospital after Januaryi:
1974.

Apparently appellant reasons that sinceJanuaryl:i

1974, was the date when it was suggested that the appe!lr
be transferred to the Utah State Prison, he should obtai:
credit for the time thereafter spent in treatment at the
hospital.

. wholly unreasonable',
However, such a request is

,,j

inasmuch as there is no record that the appellant himse ..
even requested transfer at that time.

Moreover, the Jet.
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I

in which the suggestion of transfer was made, was no
more than a suggestion having no binding force or effect on
the court.
As previously stated, the purposes of commitment
to a mental health facility are entirely different than
those underlying a sentence to a penal institution.

Case

law supports this view.
In People v. Safell, 599 P.2d 92 (Cal. 1979),
the court faced issues similar to those raised by the appellant
in the present case.

In upholding California's mentally

disordered sex of fender (MDSO) statute against equal
protection attack, the court noted that the commitment of
MDSO's is for the purpose of treatment, not punishment, and
that commitment is not a substitute for punishment.

P.2d at 94, 95.
~,

599

Similar conclusions were reached in Hill v.

422 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1970), and State v. Newell,

236 A.2d 656

(Vt. 1967).

In Hill, the court agreed that

"The commitment proceedings under the statute constitute
neither a civil commitment nor a sentencing procedure, but
rather an independent criminal proceeding which is triggered

by a criminal conviction."

422 F.2d at 1197.

The court

agreed further that
An examination of the statutory
scheme discloses that the legislature
did not intend that the criminal conviction
was to become entirely irrelevant. The
purposes of the statute are to protect
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•
soci~ty from dangerous sex crimes and to
provide treatment for the dangerous sex
offender.
To accomplish those objectives
a completely indeterminate sentence is '
necessary.

422 F.2d at 1197.

Such statements are evidence that tc

allow credit for commitment to a sex offenders program:!
offset the time to be served in a penal institution wou!"
seriously undermine the objectives of treatment for the
sex offender and protection of society.

Furthermore, sci

a credit would encourage sex offenders not suffering frc:,
mental abnormalities to actively seek commitment so as

ti

serve as much time as possible in the less restrictive
confines of a mental health facility.

In a case factual:

similar to the instant case, State v. Newell, supra, the
defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of assault with
intent to comrni t

rape.

The court thereafter adjudged tr<,

defendant to be a psychopathic personality and committee
the defendant to detention and treatment as a sexual
psychopath.

On direction of the court, three subsequent
.. i

hearings were conducted to review the defendant's statu: '1
progress.

At the last of these hearings, the court founc

that the defendant was no longer a psychopathic

I
'

.
personality and imposed
equal and concurren t sentences
of from six to ten years to be served in prison.

The

I
I

defendant then instituted post-conviction relief

proceed::

contending that the sentences were erron eous for failln:
in comm1:''!
to allow credit for the almost two years served
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as a psychopathic personality.
0 bjectives

After recognizing the

of the cornrnitment statute, the court refused to

credit the defendant's sentences with the almost two years
spent in commitment.

The court reasoned that "[u]nder the pro-

vision of our statute, punishment is withheld until the
offender's mental condition no longer constitutes a threat to
the public."

236 A.2d at 658.

In the present case, the

appellant's status in treatment at the state hospital did
not go unreviewed by the court.

The appellant was afforded two

review hearings prior to the hearing at which he was placed on
probation.

The court apparently found no compelling reason

to transfer the appellant to the prison or to change his status.
On the basis of the differences in the purposes for commitment
and sentencing to a penal institution, credit for commitment
time served by the appellant is appropriately denied.
Moreover, the granting of credit for the time
served by the appellant during his commitment to the state
hospital is expressly prohibited by Utah Code Ann. §
77-49-7, which states in part:
The parole, probation, or pardon authority
may order the probation, parole, or pardon
following such a certification, and may order
the release of such persons upon such terms,
conditions, and limitations as shall appear
necessary to safeguard the convicted person
and the public.
No statute relating to t~e
remission of sentences by way of commutation
time for good behavior, or for work performed
shall apply to the person committed to the
Utah state hospital as herein provided.
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Simply stated, a person who is cormnitted to the state
hospital can receive no commutation time.
Even if it were possible for the appella~
to be credited with the time served during commitment,
the issue is more appropriately presented before the
Board of Pardons.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-62-3 states in

part:
It shall be the duty of the board of
pardons to determine by majority decision,
when and under what conditions, subject to
the provisions of this act, persons now or
hereafter serving sentences • . . in t~
penal or correctional institutions of this
state, may be released upon parole,
pardoned, or may have their fines or
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences
commuted or terrnina ted; provided, no fine
or forfeiture shall be remitted, no parole
or pardon granted, or commutation or sentencE
terminated, except after a full hearing
before said board.
As indicated, appellant's request for time credit is
appropriately addressed to the Board of Pardons in the:::
instance, and not to this Court.

In any event, however,

credit should be denied.
POINT IV
IN THE ABSENCE OF APPELLANT'S OBJECTION
TO THE HABEAS COURT JUDGE AND HIS FAILURE
TO REQUEST RECUSAL OF THAT JUDGE, THE
UNSUPPORTED ASSERTION OF "A CONFLICT OF
INTEREST" OH THE PART OF THE LOWER COURT
JUDGE IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
The discussion of the waiver doctrine and it'
f
revie> :·
application to issues not properly preserved or
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the denial of post conviction relief as contained in
Point I of this brief, is expressly incorporated in, and
applied to the instant argument.

The appellant has waived

any consideration of the issue of judge disqualification by
failing to object below or follow the statutorily prescribed
procedure contained in Utah Code Annotated 1980 Special
Supplement effective July 1, 1980.

Section 77-35-29

of that supplement states in part:
(c)
If the prosecution or defendant
in any criminal action or proceeding shall
file an affidavit that the judge before whom
such action or proceeding is to be tried or
heard as a bias or prejudice, either against
such party or his attorney or in favor of any
opposing party to the suit, such judge shall
proceed no further therein until the challenge
is disposed of.
Every such affidavit shall
state the facts and reasons for the belief
that such bias or prejudice exists and shall
be filed as soon as practicable after the case
has been assigned or such bias or prejudice
is known.
No such affidavit shall be filed
unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel
of record that such affidavit and application are
made in good faith.
(See also Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 63(b)).

In the

present case, appellant filed no affidavit or certificate
of good faith at any time before or during the hearing on
his petition for habeas corpus relief.

The absence of

such an application or objection is sufficient to waive
review of the issue on appeal.
In Jackson v. State, 247 S.E.2d 512 (Ga.Ct.App.
19 7U), the appellant similarly failed to interpose a timely
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objection.

As the court stated:
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44

Appellant enumerates as error, in
each case, the failure of the trial jud~
to disqualify himself in a proceeding
involving the sufficiency of search
warrants which he had issued personally.
However, the appellant failed to raise a
proper objection, and "waiver of
disqualification of a judge may be
effected expressly by agreement, or
impliedly proceeding without objection
with the trial of the case with knowledge
of the disqualification.
i

Id.

In this c~se, the aopellant was aware that the habea i

court judge had earlier sentenced the appellant and place:'
him on probation.

i

Appellant's failure to object should

j'

not be rewarded by the consideration of this issue on a;c.
In United States v. Azhocar, 581 F.2d 735 (9tt..
1978), the appellant filed an affidavit and moved for rec.

on the ground of bias.

The trial judge held the affidavrl

to be legally insufficient and proceeded to trial on the I
case.

On appeal, the appellant not only alleged this

rd,
i

to be erroneous, but also alleged that other adverse rul!::
made by the trial judge were evidence of bias.

The revie•

court replied to appellant's assertions by noting that a:
and sufficient affidavit was a prerequisite to recusal.
F.2d at 738.

As to his claims that adverse rulings were

_ ·
.
t's claims
evidence of bias, tne court reJected appe 11 an

by stating:

· · t affidavit
"First, no timely and sufficien-

stating these claims was ever f i. 1 e d .

Appellant's failu:e
f

to follow these procedural requirements there or
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e defea'.
'

I'

l

charge of bias."

581 F.2d at 738.

The Ninth Circuit

court of Appeals further noted the requirements for a
legally sufficient affidavit:
Thus, to be legally sufficient, the
affidavit must meet three requirements.
It must state facts which if true fairly
support the allegation that bias or
prejudice stemming from (1) an extrajudicial
source (2) may prevent a fair decision on the
merits.
The focus is not only on the source
of the facts and their distorting effect on
a decision on the merits as required by
Grimrnell, but also on (3) the substantiality of
the support given by these facts to the allegation of bias, as required by Berger.

Id.

Not only has appellant waived the issue of judge

disgualif ication by failing to interpose a timely objection,
but also by failing to file the requisite affidavit and
certificate of good faith.

Moreover, had the appellant

objected and filed his affidavit in a timely manner, the
merits of the allegations would not have been legally
sufficient to compel recusal.
The appellant could have further guarded against
any potential "conflict of interest" on the part of judges
of the Third Judicial District by filing his petition in
another court.

Rule 65(f) (2) of the Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure states:

"The [habeas corpus] cor,1plaint shall

be filed in the court most convenient to the plaintiff·"
Tne appellant was thus not limited to filing his petition in
tne Third Judicial District Court, but could have filed it
J.n

any court of convenience.
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In view of the fact that appellant cites no
authority in support of his claim for relief resulting
from a so-called "conflict of interest," and has waived
this Court's consideration of the issue by failing to
object or follow the statutory procedure for judge
disqualification, this Court should disregard appellant'
claim.
CONCLUSION

The appellant has failed to allege claims upm
which his requested relief can be granted.

Even if thi:

Court was able to disregard the failure of appellant to

properly preserve his allegations for appeal, the allega
are totally lacking in merit in that the appellant was
properly cornrni tted and sentenced under the laws of this
state.

Furthermore, appellant lacks standing to prosecu

his due process and equal protection claims because his
were not adversely affected by the appropriate applicatl
Utah Code Ann.

§

77-49-1 et seq.

Respondent notes that this brief was prepared
·
1 e t e recor d .
f rom an 1ncomp

Among the numerous deficienc

in the record, the respondent did not have the benefit

0

reading the contents of the transcript which was designa
and ordered by the appellant, but was not, for whatever
reason, part of the record on appeal (R. at 41,
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42

411

' '"

The respondent therefore submits this brief in the
interest of avoiding any further delay, but respectfully
reserves the right, based on the accompanying motion,
to submit a supplemental brief in the event that
respondent's position is prejudiced or compromised by the
filing of documents and transcripts at some later date
which are not presently a part of the record on appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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